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The CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
Re-engineered 
 
Abstract 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) remains the only instrument that has been capable of 
delivering cash flow at scale to investments with emissions reduction benefits in developing countries. 
Although cash flows have largely dried up, the need for earning operational premiums on assets with 
lower emission profiles than their traditional investment alternatives is intact. Cash flows must not be 
confused with financing, and although sometimes labeled 'results-based financing' (which in isolation is a 
contradiction in terms as finance is ex ante while results are ex post), the CDM experience has shown that 
unless someone guarantees the result – in CDM the 'emissions reduction outcome' – the market will adopt 
a ‘wait-and-see’ approach and abstain from participating financially on the basis of prospective cash flows. 
New mechanisms, like the CDM, that deliver new and untried benefits are therefore at a significant risk 
of attracting no financing at all. This, too, is true for the new mechanisms established in the Paris 
Agreement, which is to deliver ‘ITMOs’ (Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes’) yet to be 
defined (with net mitigation impacts). 
The CDM experience provides a basis for engineering such mechanism, or indeed reengineering the CDM 
itself, to make it a viable mitigation financing tool, providing receipts for payments in the form of certified 
emission reductions (CER). Two solutions are presented, both of which secure new financing for projects 
that deliver real and measurable emissions reduction benefits on the basis of prospective revenues from 
emissions reduction: one introduces up-front securitization of the emissions reductions; the other builds 
on a defined value of the CERs without the need for a carbon price or a market for trading.  
Most of us use simple heuristics as a mental shortcut to ease the cognitive load of making a decision. The 
problem is once one gets used to a heuristic, it is used to make momentous decisions or none at all — 
when analysis points to conflict one is at risk of rejecting the obvious in order to stay with the heuristic. 
The same can be said about the way the CDM has come to be viewed. Its structure can be optimized, but 
despite the inescapable decline of the carbon market and mounting calls by Parties for change, only 
surgical changes have been undertaken so far.   
Evidence for setting straight the CDM heuristic has been around for a long time. Simply put CERs are not 
project finance and do not address project capital needs when most needed — upfront1. CER based 
returns are available only after a project is operational. That is why only one third of registered CDM 
                                                          
1 A small subset of CDM projects, the one-revenue-stream projects that only has income from the carbon market, 
mainly industrial gasses and landfill gas flaring projects, were sufficiently profitable (IRRs measured in 100s of per 
cent) to get financed without collateral or risk cover; the industrial gasses projects probably all balance sheet 
financed. 
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projects went as far as to get their carefully calculated CERs issued. Despite these fundamentals many 
staunch believers in the CDM continue to hold on to the idea that 'if only demand could be recreated by 
establishing a price on carbon all would be good'. Would it really? 
CDM demand is on life support at the moment with only a few sovereign and multilateral buying 
programmes that tender or buy and cancel CERs on the part of philanthropic sponsors. Most CERs change 
hands at market prices below the cost to issue them and investment board rooms, once hyped on the 
CDM, go to great lengths to avoid the three letter acronym. 
On the other hand the CDM is a unique instrument in the landscape of climate finance — not because of 
its ability to link to international carbon markets or how it has effectively engaged the private sector in 
low carbon projects. The CDM is unique because it represents the only 'cash flow instrument' in the 
climate finance toolbox for emerging economies. Recognized by half of all of INDCs submitted2, it can 
complement project financing and directly catalyze (when not then indirectly) a shift in private capital and 
investment flows toward low carbon development. It does this with internationally recognized high 
quality measurements protocols and is undisputed in tracking GHGs mitigation outcomes.  
This working paper takes an essential look at the CDM and proposes a way to transform it into a true 
climate finance instrument based on its prospective cash flow. Two elementary solutions to improving the 
CDM are offered: 
1) a  're-engineered CDM' with an securitization model added that allows the cash flows offered by 
Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) to function as a project finance instrument, 
and  
2) a 'risk internalization device' that creates up-front securities and frontloads payments for 
emission reductions, enabling it to contribute to project financing and turns CERs into “receipts 
for payments” in a true 'results based finance' model.  
 
A really short story of the rise and fall of the CDM 
The CDM was the surprise of the Kyoto Protocol almost 20 years ago. With no guidelines except a few 
enshrined principles, policy details were drawn up in what became the Marrakech Accords in just under 
four years. With just a few institutions doing CDM implementation and a tiny secretariat, experimentation 
and learning-by-doing was the implementation model that turned policy into operation where even the 
methodologies for calculating emissions reductions were developed by market players.  
In every respect it was a learning experience, and the CDM Executive Board (EB) and its technical panels 
were learning with the market, expressing its newly learnt experiences in a flow of guidance and 
clarification and methodology revisions to help prospective project developers produce ‘correct’ 
estimates of their projects’ emissions reduction effect. Unintentionally, the CDM-EB created undue 
                                                          
2 Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined contributions 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf 
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uncertainty in the market by constantly adjusting the rules, fuelling perceptions of registration and 
issuance risks.  Conversely, the financing of CDM projects was left entirely to development banks and the 
market in general to deal with. Furthermore, through no ill intent the CDM-EB incrementally unloaded 
operational risk, such as quality, eligibility and performance onto third party verifiers, national country 
representative’s and project financiers. From a funders perspective the CDM became a complex asset 
creation process, where the carbon price provided the only incentive for using it.  
At the same time, projects were supposed to deliver CERs to a newly created international carbon market. 
This market became de facto the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS had its own 
challenges in auctioning allowances, with generous allocations (and surplus Assigned Amount Units 
emerging from Eastern European countries) and definitions of “supplementarity” that set limits (or not) 
on the use of CERs.  
As noted above, as a cash flow instrument that does not directly address capital investment needs, the 
CDM needed an instrument to transform future cash flow into present investment capital, in effect 
frontloading payments for emission reductions. Hence the frontloading had to be delivered “externally” 
via advance payments, sometimes in the form of supplier’s credit lines. However, due to defaults, poor 
project performance and uncertainty in the earliest days of the CDM it did not take long before buyers 
hard coded 'payment-on-delivery' into most Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPA): nobody 
paid for CERs before they were actually issued by the CDM-EB. The accumulation of CDM risks made an 
ERPA practically worthless as collateral. 
The entrance of China in 2005-2006 to a CDM market that was then dominated by India was probably the 
start of the decline of the CDM as supply of CERs grew significantly to finally outstrip demand. China 
quickly became the source of two thirds of CERs on the market churning out 100 new projects a month. 
When Lehman Brothers preempted the financial crisis in 2008-2009 the ensuing recession caused 
emissions to fall further reducing demand for emission allowances in the EU-ETS such that supply 
outstripped demand for all carbon units. Within a short period CER prices once 18 euro per ton, fell to just 
short of 'zero' at 0.16 euro in 2011-12. Meanwhile, China had started to absorb some of its own CDM 
projects into its pilot emission trading schemes, expected to be operational at national scale soon. Other 
project developers were less fortunate and a huge potential supply of CERs (corresponding to 6,600 Mt 
CO2e) to 2020 awaits an investor with an unusual appetite for arbitrage. Realistically, and without him, 
effectuated issuance will at the most be 10 times lower3. 
In less than a decade the most revolutionary, internationally recognized baseline and crediting mechanism 
ever developed under a multiparty context was conceptualized, operationalized, expanded to a global 
flagship, and then practically wiped out before the end of the first commitment period of its founding 
Kyoto Protocol, leaving behind an industry and infrastructure that had developed around it with an 
uncertain future and no exit strategy.   
But it wasn't just the market…  
                                                          
3 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing, World Bank 2015 
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It is tempting to regard the demise of the CDM as only attributable to a once-in-a-lifetime global financial 
crisis and resultant disappearance of demand for emission allowances. But unfortunately the CDM 
suffered from a couple of other ills too. Designed to help realize new investments that were otherwise 
not financeable, the value of the ERPA was supposed to make a difference to project finance. The positive 
shift in project internal rate of return (IRR), as a carbon revenue calculation exercise, was supposed to 
bring the unviable venture into viability. But it did not make the project bankable. Very few were 
interested in checking, if the prospective additional CER-based cash flows (paid on delivery only) made 
financiers and bankers excited – as the additional investment finance needed for the CDM project was 
supposed to come from the same bankers anyway.  
 
In all the visionary experimentalism that characterized the CDM, commercial and development lenders 
were implicitly supposed to deliver their part of the deal by providing additional investment capital to 
CDM projects. They were expected to attach a value to an ERPA, but seldom got the mandate from their 
internal fiduciary oversight to do so. Project developers therefore had to find financing for their 
investments, largely disregarding the prospective value of the CERs in the financing plan. The term 'icing 
on the cake', became a widespread term for the CDM. Banks may have behaved differently had this novel 
international market for immaterial products, the 
demand for which was secured only via a fluid 
political process in one corner of the globe, been in 
line with good fiduciary duty. Buyers of CERs 
implicitly expressed their distrust by insisting on 
the payment-on-delivery terms, lumping all the 
system risk (on top of the project risk) on the 
developer – and his banking partner, should it have 
accepted to play along. The intended functionality 
of the entire system ultimately depended on a 
handful of banks willing to accept the risk for a new 
commodity in a new trading system, which they did 
not fully understand, while those who did 
understand didn't care or dare, or didn't want to! 
 
The cash flow  
CDM's core challenge is to function as a results-
based financing mechanism for emissions 
reduction investments. Without a collateral value 
placed on the ERPA the mechanism produced a 
cash flow that arrived at a time when project 
financial barriers were long since overcome. The financial contribution from the CDM simply arrived too 
late to support the financial structuring of the investment.  
In defense the CDM at least got it half right. In traditional project finance future cash flows are capitalized 
through the intervention of finance institutions – banks or equity investors. Otherwise, project finance 
To improve energy efficiency in schools a small upfront 
payment is made by a financier. The schools are to impose 
behavioral changes (as opposed to investments), for 
instance to keep windows closed to save cooling. If it works 
(probably only if the upfront payment is spent on hiring a 
'window closer' who gets his salary and therefore sees his 
interest in closing windows) energy consumption is 
reduced, the result is achieved and RBF is released. If there 
is no requirement on the usage of the RBF (parallel to the 
payments for CERs) the pupils (and the window closer) will 
get ice cream (and the head master some icing on the cake). 
But in this case the RBF is predestined to be used for double 
glazed windows to reach the next level of energy efficiency.  
If the two steps are reversed, nothing will happen. If the 
idea is to install the windows first (for which the upfront 
payment is far from sufficient), where are the funds going 
to come from? A supplier credit? The bank? The public 
budget? RBF will always require bridge financing from 
another source that believes in the result – as opposed to 
the supplier of the RBF. 
Text Box 1. Results-based financing example 
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would not be feasible as there are no assets to use as collateral. In such structures the certainty of future 
cash flows is paramount. The large majority of CDM projects that are based on energy production produce 
long term 'safe' cash flows through Power Purchase Agreements (PPA). An ERPA is comparable to a PPA 
as payment is on delivery of the product - the difference being that a PPA´s product is material (electricity), 
while an ERPA is an intangible tradable right to emit GHGs. The demand for the first is certain and backed 
by one hundred years of delivery. So banks are willing to regard it as collateral. The demand for the ERPA´s 
product is uncertain, immaterial and has comparatively no track record making it insufficient for the banks 
to treat as collateral.  
Here is where the CDM failed – only one third of registered CDM projects attempted to realize the carbon 
finance they chose the CDM for in the first place. When a project was established and a financing plan put 
together, a typical project developer would sign an ERPA with a reputable CER buyer. But unfavorable 
ERPA terms and conditions (tight timelines and unilateral termination, replacement CER requirements 
and relative pricing) on top of a lengthy approval process, additionality uncertainty and questionable 
issuance performance (delays, lower issuance rate) for CDM projects in general, and all contributed to 
making the ERPA a high risk low value financing instrument. As a result, banks, most of which were local 
and not familiar with assessing CDM project risks effectively never accepted ERPAs as collateral on 
projects balance sheet – despite that carbon finance was supposed to prove project additionality (see 
CDM financial additionality requirements). 
The CDM is therefore an example of how the principles behind 'results based financing' should not work 
– or it serves to conclude that 'results based financing' is only relevant in situations where no investment 
is needed and thus not a viable financing principle for the large majority of emissions reduction projects – 
unless, as suggested below, the principle is tweaked. In actions that aim at influencing behavior only, 
'financing' is in fact only a reward. It is not needed to finance anything, unless there is a specific 
requirement to use the finance for a specific future purpose (but not for the purpose that created the 
result). Akin to payments for CERs that had no predefined investment destination imposed by buyers and 
therefore could be speculated. Only if 'results based financing' contracts are understood and accepted by 
banks as collateral can they be effective in structuring the financing of an investment. If a bank regards 
the contract as too risky, it should walk away from the deal. In CDM it did. 
On the whole 'results based financing' is an illogical label for the CDM-ERPA model. It is a simple promise 
to purchase CERs on delivery, thus constituting only the prospect of a result to base a future payment 
upon. 
 
Solution number one – risk guarantee 
 
Guarantees are a type of “insurance policy” protecting banks and investors from the risks of non-
performance and have been the mainstay of financial markets for many decades. They are a promise of 
indemnification up to a specified amount in the case of default or non-performance of an asset. When 
used to back projects they have shown to provide much needed security for mobilizing risk capital.  
 
6 
 
The CDM assets (the CERs and ERPAs) have been parked outside, not making the threshold for bank due 
diligence, but not making it to the insurance market either.  
 
Part of the reason why no risk-cover has been established has been a general unwillingness, by the 
regulator, its oversight and support structure, to take on risk. This stems from a perceived 
“unmaterialised” or “contingent” liability4 , even though realistically the regulator would never come in a 
situation where it would actually have to pay monetary penalties, as it would always be able to indemnify 
itself through the issuance of CERs.5  In other words, as the risk concerned is an issuance risk, and the 
regulator is in charge of the issuance, it can never come in an ‘issuance shortfall’ situation and thus never 
become liable to pay up reparations. In those few situations where the project fails on its core activity 
(commonly power production) and thus also fails on the emissions reduction, the issuance of guaranteed 
CERs would become an environmental liability and not a monetary one.  
 
Therefore, an obvious solution is the elimination of the inherent CDM risk. For CDM this means project 
registration and CER issuance risks must be eliminated. However, guaranteeing project registration is 
tantamount to 'opening the floodgates' – any project would become a CDM project, but it would entail 
nothing more and achieve nothing.  Therefore a more amenable solution is to guarantee the issuance of 
CERs, which is the core of the banks' requirement – the cash flow (after which the financing can no longer 
be said to be results based). The past 10 years of operation of the CDM has accumulated a large 
information base of project characteristics and factors. Emission factors from CDM projects are used by 
practically all international finance institutions for ex-ante loan due diligence and technical assistance. If 
a wind turbine project is constructed, there is a significant probability that it will issue about 84% of the 
expected CERs. Similarly for a waste heat recovery project, there is a known chance that the project will 
deliver 79% of the expectation once constructed. This statistical base can be used in a 'reverse 
engineering' of the approval process for the CDM.  
 
Removing the contingent liability means that all that is needed for granting a guarantee of CER issuance 
based on statistically derived expectation of CER issuance is a digital application that internalizes the 
complexity of the CDM – the user simply checks boxes and chooses from lists of options (similar but more 
extensive than the digitized methodologies under development) that reflect project characteristics, the 
level of detail depending on the statistical basis for differentiation. To provide the regulator with a control 
gate, a sliding scale6 'conservativeness premium' on the amount of CERs guaranteed could be subtracted. 
That would take care of the environmental liability of projects that default on their core activity as 
mentioned above. 
 
                                                          
4 A contingent liability is an obligation to cover payment that depends on the outcome of a future event: thus, the 
timing and the amount of any payment cannot be known when the contingent liability is assumed. 
5 which is a matter of environmental integrity. It has been demonstrated, however, that the current system has 
environmental integrity issues with projects that materialize and have been registered without the 'documented' 
financial contribution from CERs. 
6 probably reflecting the variance in observed issuance success of similar operational projects 
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An issuance guarantee is also the de facto registration of a CDM project, thereby eliminating the 
registration risk. At the same time there is built-in certainty on the amount of emissions reduction that is 
awarded to a project, which eliminates the verification and issuance risk.  
 
 
Figure 1. The idea of a reversely engineered CDM was first presented in 'Financial Engineering of Climate Investment 
in Developing Countries (S. Lütken, 2014) from where this illustration is borrowed 
 
With an elementary process flow swop, putting what used to be at end up front, the CDM becomes an 
actual climate finance tool. With absolute certainty of issuance, all that remains is for the lender to assess 
is the fiduciary quality of the buyer. This is a process that banks are familiar with. If buyers are reputable, 
as has often been the case in ERPAs, the ERPA might become AAA rated collateral; its product, the CER, 
achieving a value at par with the electricity of a PPA.  
 
Another advantage is that in principle the only condition the project developer must fulfill is that the 
project has to be built. This is the same condition that any other financier will pose, releasing funds when 
financial closure or specific engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) milestones are reached. As 
the emissions reductions remain a marginal benefit to the core investment – wind turbines are built to 
produce power; waste heat recovery projects are built to save energy – finance can be  released against 
the CER guarantee on a pro rata basis agreed between the project developer and the leading financier.  
Additional control systems are not required as the transparency framework of the CDM allows other 
stakeholders with a higher stake in the project to see what is going on. As the interests of the asset 
operator and the CDM regulator are aligned the latter can adopt a minority stakeholder role and issue the 
guaranteed CERs, for example on an annual basis, upon proof of operation.  
The tenor of the issuance the guarantee can be determined in several ways, with the most pragmatic 
being to set a maximum number of years and a maximum percentage (15%) of the typical investment, 
whichever comes first. In Table 1 two technologies are presented on the basis of average generation of 
CERs and the value of the CERs after 3, 5 and 7 years as a percentage of the investment assuming a set 
price of 10 US$ per CER. 
Technology average issuance % years of 
issuance 
average CERs/ 
investment $ 
% of investment  
@ 10$/CER 
  
 
 
 
Current CDM procedure               Reverse engineering the CDM 
Issuance Verification Monitoring 
PDD Validation Registration 
Issuance Verification Monitoring 
PIN Registration Validation 
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Wind 
 
84%  
(819 projects) 
3 years 
5 years 
7 years 
0.004706 4.7 
0.007843 7.8 
0.01098 11.0 
Waste heat 79% 
(85 projects) 
3 years 
5 years 
7 years 
0.02111 21.1 
0.035184 35.2 
0.049257 49.2 
Table 1. Potential investment contribution from CERs 
Table 1 shows that the investment contribution from CERs for waste heat projects already before  one 
year of operation exceeds a 15% investment guarantee limit (at an assumed price of 10 US$/CER). The 
percentages reflect the actual CER generation and not the amount claimed at project registration. Wind 
energy is the least cost efficient technology in terms of investment per generated CER7 and requires 
significantly longer time to produce any noteworthy investment contribution. However, even for wind 
energy projects only 6-7 years of guaranteed CERs can have a positive impact on the financial structure of 
a project. For example in Text box 2 a wind project receives 6 years of issuance guarantee so that the 
resulting 720,000 CERs minus a conservativeness premium of 100,000 CERs effectively close the finance 
gap. The guarantee corresponds to 7.5% of the investment, thus remaining below a 15% limit on total 
investment. 
 
 
Securing the integrity of the system 
Critics of re-engineering the CDM will point out that projects will underperform and be rewarded with too 
many CERs - a relevant concern. As the approach is based on average CER issuance per invested dollar – 
some will over-perform and others will underperform. On average, it balances out – hence it is only the 
individual project developers whose projects are over-performing that may be unfairly treated. 
Underperforming projects that lose core business cash flows may in fact need additional support to keep 
reducing GHG emissions. It appears fair in such cases to reward the risk willingness of investors who invest 
in technologies that also result in high quality emissions reductions, also when conditions do not pan out 
                                                          
7 See the working paper 'Penny Wise, Pound Foolish', S. E. Lütken, UNEP Risø 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Text Box 2  
50 MW wind energy  
Investment 80 million US$  
Expected annual issuance: 120,000 CERs  
CER price: 10 US$ 
Equity secured:  24 million US$ 
Loan secured: 50 million US$ 
Gap: 6 million US$ 
Annual CER value: 1,200,000 US$ 
 
The wind project has secured sufficient equity 
(30% of the investment). 62.5% loan capital 
has been raised. 7.5% is missing, which can be 
covered by 5 years of expected CER 
generation (6 million USD). One more year is 
added to the guarantee tenor as 
conservativeness measure; hence 720,000 
CERs will be issued for the first 6 years of 
operation, guaranteed. 
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as planned. The proposed ‘conservativeness premium’ from all issuance guarantees is intended to cover 
those situations.  
 
Others will point to the risk of non-additionality of projects that are already too profitable compared to 
the IRR benchmarks for additionality. Such criticism would not be justified. Applied benchmarks are in any 
case arbitrary and have never been proof of additionality. Most importantly, however, the fact that the 
ERPA can now be used as collateral for financing is more likely to prove additionality. Assuming that all 
available investment collateral is currently employed, the arrival of additional collateral (in the form of 
CER guarantees) will also result in additional investment. In this light the current approach to determining 
additionality is highly questionable, whereas the guarantee approach is effectively a replacement of 
additionality testing.  
 
Costs savings on simplified approval procedures are significant – project documentation (PDD), validation, 
registration, monitoring and verification all fall away. This benefits smaller project developers in particular 
and makes the CDM a more competitive instrument. The current illogical disregard of CDM related 
administrative costs in the calculation of project IRRs would no longer occur. 
There is no need to abolish the current CER or project approval process - it runs as is. If project developers 
wish to include the entire potential CER production of their projects they apply for the full emission 
reduction via the usual application procedure with full PDD, validation and full-registration and 
verification. The initially determined eligibility for issuance is not re-visited, but there is a risk of losing a 
share of the guaranteed CERs to balance the potential gains from registration. Any potential deduction 
from the guarantee, however, would be adopted as an actual deduction by a bank accepting the ERPA as 
collateral. Therefore, such a deduction should be capped to 10% in order for the full registration to have 
any appeal. In other words, developers who think they can deliver more than the statistically based and 
guaranteed CERs can opt for traditional registration and if doing so they adopt the risk of losing 10% of 
the guaranteed CERs, while their upside (in the form of not guaranteed CERs) is open ended (i.e. they can 
over-perform by any percentage if verified following current procedure).  
Without being able to assess exactly how many non-additional projects will sail through the system with 
only a guarantee is difficult to say, but there will probably also  be a number of additional projects that 
will settle for the guaranteed issuance and not proceed to the full cycle CDM. These two opposite drivers 
may well equalize each other out. The question is simply what is better: an illusory additionality test or 
abolishing stringency in favor of entrusting the banks to provide additional finance on the basis of 
guarantees that the regulator is in the best position to provide and control.  
 
What about demand for these CERs and lack of data? 
There are obviously challenges related to those types of projects that so far have not established any 
issuance record and therefore cannot produce performance data upon which a CER guarantee or loan can 
be established. This could be taken care of through a particularly risk willing guarantee or loan structure 
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The model presented here may further not be needed for relatively ‘capital-light’ project types such as 
methane / industrial gas flaring. Also projects that scale continuously such as distributed household 
technologies (cookstoves, solar home systems) may not need a full guarantee and be financeable on an 
actual results-basis, assuming revenues from early results are re-invested into scale up. Therefore these 
project types could/should probably be addressed separately – e.g. using a put-option ERPAs model like 
the one currently experimented with under the World Bank Pilot Auction Facility. 
Allowing the CERs a real role in the financial structuring of projects by establishing an issuance guarantee 
described above does not recreate demand for CERs. Its success therefore depends partly on restored 
carbon prices, possibly driven by international governmental organizations (IGO´s) and INDCs, many of 
which already indicate a need for off-sets. Also the Paris Agreement establishes a mechanism that seems 
to resemble the CDM. But even in a CDM positive scenario a buyer for the latent surplus of supply from 
existing CDM projects has to be found. Exactly this is not required in solution number two. 
Solution number two – receipt for payments 
 
In the current setting most CDM project developers choose to prove the additionality of their projects by 
producing a financial argument that makes a non-viable project viable through the prospective CER-
revenues. This is a quite fictitious exercise as it is not related to the actual financing of the project. 
Therefore the developer has a certain flexibility in setting both construction cost, expected project 
performance and the carbon price in order to arrive at plausible figures in terms of proving that the carbon 
revenues are decisive for the investment decision. Due diligence is not performed by a bank, but by a 
validator who has comparably little at stake if the figures do not add up in the end, - whereas a bank 
lending money to the venture cannot afford to be quite so lax. This is not to say that the validators do not 
do their job, and do it well, but their job is not, and was never supposed to be financial due diligence. Had 
the approval system been closer related to the actual financing of projects, i.e. the banks' lending 
operations, the current CDM validation step (prior to registration) might have been abolished altogether. 
 
This assumption is the basis for solution number two. When banks offer to finance projects, they do so on 
the basis of thorough due diligence that beyond the numbers and the expected IRR, mostly look at risks 
and risk cover. The only difference for a CDM project is that banks also have to assess the risk on the 
carbon revenues – which is what solution number one takes care of. In solution number two the bank 
absorbs the carbon revenue risk by offering to accept CERs as receipts for payments.  
It should be kept in mind that the CDM project is one and the same as the investment project. That means 
that all data to support a financial due diligence will already have to be retrieved and analyzed. In this 
process the bank would consider if the finances in e.g. a renewable energy project match up. Commonly 
this could be due to established feed-in tariffs – in which case the projects are unlikely to be additional 
(which, however, in the current setting has not prevented CDM registration). In the cases, where it does 
not, the host country may not have an established feed-in tariff system or does not offer sufficiently 
attractive PPAs, both of which is altogether reasonable for strained developing country budgets. In these 
cases the CERs may be a source of additional income – exactly as the CDM was thought out at the outset, 
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but if the CER revenues are to make the difference they must be risk free, i.e. the carbon market risk, the 
registration risk and the issuance risk must be eliminated.  
This would effectively be the result if the bank provides the option for the developer to repay part of the 
loan with CERs – and if CER issuance is automatized on the basis of the aforementioned performance data 
from already operational CDM projects (although there may be a need for an issuing entity in order to 
avoid risks of double counting). In this way CERs become a means of repayment of loans issued in 
monetary currency on the basis of a predefined carbon price. 
It is a simple amortization structure – funds are disbursed upfront as a project based construction loan, 
part of which may be repaid with CERs, which are then cancelled (or retired). This is obviously not viable 
for private sector banks seeking sound return-to-risk-ratios, but it would be a useful delivery mechanism 
for finance provided through e.g. the Green Climate Fund Private Sector facility.  
Assuming an annual amount of 100 billion is to be raised it would be beyond any logic to deploy all of it 
as loans, although this appears to be the currently expected modality. The only logical deployment 
mechanism is the provision of grant elements related to investments, much along the 'incremental costs' 
principle employed by the GEF, but with a smarter delivery mechanism, which through solution number 
two directs the funds towards the most latent financial gap in the current climate finance landscape, 
namely the emissions reduction related cash flows that so far have only been provided through the CDM.  
In this solution, the current registration system for CDM projects is maintained. In place of market based 
ERPAs is an offer from selected AEs affiliated to the GCF, which on the basis of the same statistical base 
employed in the first solution, provides a loan of up to 15% of the capital investment effectuated upon 
registration of the activity as a CDM project. A simpler registration procedure without validation is 
certainly possible, but for lending bank comfort and for the 'additionality proof' of registered projects, the 
CER-based loan component must be linked to other monetary lending from the same financial institutions, 
ideally integrated in the basic loan structure.  
A CER loan document replaces an ERPA. It effectively also replaces the market, but in place of it must be 
defined a fixed price on carbon. A logical source of a non-market based carbon price could be the GCF 
Board or an advisory function to the GCF that determines a fixed price on e.g. biennially and on the basis 
of scientific (cost of carbon) and/or market/investment related criteria. This price will be the conversion 
factor for lending arrangements, i.e. a max. 15% financial participation in an investment is converted into 
a number of CERs that need to be surrendered to the AE. In practice, the AE draws the cash on the GCF, 
and repays GCF in CERs when they are cancelled by the UNFCCC.  
A scheme like this emulates governmental purchase of CERs on an upfront payment basis, which in the 
original CDM led to fraudulent behavior of developers that never developed the projects they were 
already paid for. But in this case fraud is grossly prevented by linking the carbon revenues to fundamental 
project finance. If fraud is intended it is much more severe for the 85% of the loan that is in monetary 
currency than for the 15% that refers to a carbon revenue. It would be equal to any other fraudulent 
behavior in lending arrangements, which banks have been dealing with for centuries and therefore not 
particular to the emissions reduction element of certain types of projects. There is simply no reason to 
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treat the emissions reduction element separately from the traditional financing arrangement. Any fear of 
jeopardizing environmental integrity is also called to rest as the CERs are cancelled directly after issuance 
by the CDM-EB, hence there is no off-setting of emissions elsewhere.  
As the lending is based on the shortfall of cash flow to service the debt, it can of course not be excluded 
that such shortfalls are created – in the sense that host countries would offer PPAs less advantageous 
than they otherwise would be inclined to with the prospects of the GCF ultimately shouldering the 
additional costs. Partly, however, this could be said to be in conformity with the purpose of the GCF. 
Should such circumventions become obvious, the ultimate victims are the contributors to the GCF, who 
risk achieving less GHG emissions reduction. The GCF, however, would be in a good position to enforce 
prudence among its beneficiaries through its financial involvement in other low carbon development 
strategies and policies of countries hosting CDM projects and financed through the suggested loan 
arrangements. 
The amortization model supplements tariffs offered on PPAs or general feed-in tariffs, but does not 
replace it. Neither can a feed-in tariff replace the amortization, because the risk structures are 
complementary. The feed-in tariff holds a regulatory risk (retroactive tariff regulation, against which the 
CER functions as a (limited) insurance, because it now is as a stable price element in the revenue streams 
due to the fixed CER price agreed for amortization.  
The simple (partial) repayment by CERs of loans paid out in monetary currency may also be structured in 
other ways that are closer to a market based model. For instance the bank could act as liquid guarantor 
by acquiring the CERs at a fixed minimum price matched to a loan at prescribed intervals or offer the 
difference between an agreed price and the actual market price at the time of delivery.  
An innovative approach could also be to convert future CERs into an upfront equity contribution through 
specially created venture funds that offer equity in return for future CER delivery. Shareholder agreements 
would allocate monetary profits to traditional investors while CERs are allocated to the 'CER equity 
investor'. Such arrangements serve as risk mitigants by improving debt/equity ratios (increasing the 
equity) and bringing down the cost of capital. Ironically, this could have been the way in which the CDM 
originally had functioned, had emission constrained entities within the EU (following the national 
allocation plans) interpreted the CDM in the same way as negotiators did originally after COP7 in Kyoto. 
CDM was thought of as providing ‘where-flexibility’, i.e. providing flexibility for companies with a cap on 
their neck to reduce emissions where it would be least costly. While few, if any, emissions constrained 
entities interpreted it in this way, they could have chosen a lesser radical option to at least co-invest in 
assets with emissions reduction benefits up to the amount corresponding to the activity’s CER generation 
capacity (e.g. until the end of the first commitment period).8 In effect, this would have been following the 
above suggested principle of equity investments in return for CERs.   
                                                          
8 This is discussed at length in ‘Corporate Strategies and the CDM’ (Lütken & Michaelowa, 2008) 
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Conclusion 
 
The models presented here provide a way to ensure that GHG emissions reductions of low carbon projects 
are rewarded through a steady cash flow supporting the operation of the asset. This is the prime virtue of 
the CDM and was supposed to be the way it should function. The challenge with the CDM is that it carries 
far too much uncertainty and risk for future CER cash flows to function as collateral when the project 
sponsor raises investment capital for the project.  
The solutions presented here deliver securitized cash flows upfront and can function separately or 
together. The guarantee model can revitalize the carbon market if such be desired, whereas the loan 
model can function in the absence of a carbon market altogether in a receipt for payment (loan or equity) 
approach. The equity variant can work in both settings. All three models serve to turn the CDM into the 
climate finance tool it was supposed to be and which is still in need in the market, as documented by 
requests in over half of all INDCs submitted to date. With the gradual operationalization of the GCF it is 
almost too obvious that a reengineering of the CDM could become one of its easiest and immediately 
realizable instruments. 
Should countries having submitted INDC with built-in import of offsets chose to wait for the ITMOs 
(because the Paris Agreement documents that no CDM-affiliation is desired) they must be aware that 
unless the bitter sweetness of the CDM experience is heeded in the design of new mechanisms a bottle 
of ITMOs may very well end up tasting remarkably equal to a bottle of CERs.  
